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AUSTRALIAN EQUITY  
WARRANTS: ARE RETAIL  
INVESTORS GETTING A FAIR GO?
The AsX has two functionally similar markets for contingent equity contracts — a warrants 
market principally serving retail investors and an eTO market that may be used by retail 
and professional traders. using pricing and volatility comparisons, this study finds that 
warrants are generally overpriced and are significantly dearer than their eTO equivalents. 
The paper recommends that short selling be allowed in the warrants market in order to reduce 
the pricing differentials and end the systematic exploitation of retail warrant investors by 
warrant issuers.
The Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) and its antecedents have traded call and put 
exchange traded options (ETOs) over ASX listed stock since 1976. This was the first 
market outside the United States to trade equity options.1 In 1991, the ASX commenced 
trading third-party issued call and put warrants. Many of the traded warrants contracts 
have the same underlying security, exercise style,2 excise price and expiry date as a 
contemporaneously traded ASX option contract. The seeming duplication of contracts 
raises two important questions: Why did the ASX introduce warrants trading when its 
existing ETO (exchange traded options) market had the ability to satisfy the demand 
for price-contingent contracts to buy and sell Australian stocks? And, why have the 
two markets existed in parallel for more than 20 years?
Market segmentation appears to be the main reason. The ETO market, with its 
relatively complex trading arrangements to facilitate margin-based trading, can be 
more easily accessed by institutional and professional investors, whereas the warrants 
market, since its inception, has aimed to attract retail investors. According to Hunter 
(1999), warrants are more suited to retail investors because they are not called upon 
to write them; this being more risky than simply taking long positions. Moreover, when 
introduced, warrants traded on the existing electronic equity trading platform, which 
meant that retail investors could directly trade warrants via internet systems provided 
by brokers. At the time (and up to 1997), options were traded on a ‘floor’ where 
brokers executed orders placed by the traders.
The existence of dual markets offering functionally equivalent instruments is unusual in 
global financial markets and we could find no non-Australian studies that investigated 
relationships between related warrants and ETOs. There are, however, two previous 
Australian studies. Lee (2000) found evidence of warrant overpricing, although the 
results of the study are subject to the criticism that non-contemporaneous pricing 
data formed the basis of his findings. A more recent study by Bertin et al. (2010) 
investigated the lead/lag price dynamics between the two markets rather than the 
question of pricing parity in the two markets. 
The central contention of this study is that functionally identical instruments should 
trade at the same price (according to the law of one price), unless there are differences 
in the institutional arrangements for trading these two instruments that justify the  
price difference. 
Institutional arrangements; ETOs and warrants
The main specifications of option contracts are the underlying security, the option type 
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(call or put), the exercise style (European or American), 
the contract size, the expiry date and the exercise price. 
Traders can take long or short positions in ETOs, and 
the clearinghouse (ASX Clear) operates a margin 
management system, ASX Derivatives Margining System 
(ADMS). ASX Clear calls margins from the brokers 
who, in turn, call margins from their clients. The ADMS 
offsets individual option positions to arrive at an overall 
‘portfolio’ margin value for each option market trading 
entity. ASX Clear manages the aggregate positions of the 
participating options brokers who, in turn, are responsible 
for managing their clients’ positions.
The market attracts traders through low transaction 
costs, such as small trading commissions and narrow 
bid-ask spreads. The ASX employs a system of market 
makers and those who fulfil their obligations to maintain 
market liquidity, either on a continuous basis or on a quote 
request basis, are rewarded by the ASX with lower trade 
registration fees. 
The warrant market
Historically, warrants were company issued call options 
over their own stock. Initially ASX warrants were also 
equity options over Australian-listed equities. Currently, 
however, the ASX warrants market trades a wide variety 
of derivative instruments. Moreover, the ASX warrants 
market has moved away from its option origins as a 
number of the most traded warrants, such as Minis 
and International LEPOs, have very little or no option 
component and are more like forward/CFD instruments.3  
Data on the dimensions of the warrants market are 
presented in Table 1.
This study focuses on ordinary call and put equity 
warrants which, while producing some 35 per cent of ASX 
warrant volume, have had a much smaller (4.7 per cent) 
share of the value of ASX warrant trading to date in 2011. 
While the share may be small, it is worth noting that the 
total value of the turnover in ordinary equity warrants 
exceeded $500 million in 2010. 
Applications to list a new warrants series must be 
accompanied by a Product Description Statement 
(PDS) that specifies the nature of the instrument and 
the conditions under which it will trade. Most of their 
specifications are the same as for equity ETOs but 
warrants have two further specifications: the warrant  
issue size and the warrant conversion ratio. 
The issue size is not really a constraint as there is no 
initial public offering (IPO) for equity warrants but rather 
the warrant issuer normally stands ready to continue to 
issue fresh securities throughout the life of the warrant 
by maintaining an active offer price and volume presence 
during market trading hours.
The warrant conversion ratio specifies the number of 
warrants needed to be exercised to purchase one unit 
of the underlying security. Most ASX warrants have 
conversion ratios of between 4:1 and 6:1 whereas ETO 
TABLE 1: Warrant market activity for 2011*
Type Warrant Volume Value
Traditional Trading
Commodity 3,616,692 0.9% 7,713,835 0.8%
Currency 802,221 0.2% 294,939 0.0%
Equity 148,338,626 35.0% 47,678,955 4.7%
Equity Barrier 67,626,430 15.9% 64,036,620 6.3%
Index 34,416,558 8.1% 25,535,872 2.5%
Index Barrier 10,996,812 2.6% 12,783,385 1.3%
Investment# Various 74,191,761 17.5% 302,865,623 29.9%
International LEPOs 3,884,269 0.9% 177,514,203 17.5%
Minis 80,414,145 19.0% 374,805,205 37.0%
Total 424,287,514 100.0% 1,013,228,637 100.0%
*Market volume and value, May year to date. 
Source: ASX.
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conversion ratios are 1:1. The higher the conversion ratio 
the lower is the price per warrant, which may have a 
superficial appeal to retail traders, but has no effect on 
any other important feature of a warrant. 
Warrants trade on the ASX’s equity trading system ASX 
Trade. Warrant transactions are registered and cleared 
through CHESS. Retail investors are more familiar with 
CHESS trading and settling arrangements than they are 
with the trading and settling arrangements of ASX options 
that are designed to support margin trading. 
Issuers are required to provide a reasonable bid quote 
with sufficient volume on a continuous basis during 
market opening hours to enable investors to closeout an 
open long warrant position. On the expiry date, the issuer 
of the warrant is required to accommodate the exercise 
requirements of warrant holders; to purchase (sell) the 
contracted quantity of the underlying security from any 
in-the-money call (put) warrant holders. Most warrant 
issuers choose to hedge the resulting exposure to risk of 
loss4 in one of two ways. First, the issuer can purchase an 
equivalent offsetting ETO contract. The advantage of this 
strategy is that it completely eliminates warrant risk as the 
long ETO position is the mirror image of the issuer’s short 
warrant position. The disadvantage of the ETO hedge 
strategy is that the ETO market is often thinly traded 
(see Table 3 below) and an attempt to hedge a large 
warrant position could have a significant impact on ETO 
prices, and thus erode a proportion of the warrant issuer’s 
potential profit. Alternatively, the issuer can delta hedge 
their positions.5 The advantage of delta hedging is that 
it involves transacting in the ASX stock market which is 
much more liquid than the ETO market. The disadvantage 
of delta hedging is that it is less precise than option 
hedging and usually has greater transactions costs.  
Data and analysis
Data for this study was accessed from IRESS; a 
commercial provider of contemporaneous trading data. 
The warrant and ETO data for a particular stock was 
collected within the shortest possible time interval (usually 
a two- or three-minute period) in an attempt to minimise 
the problem of data non-synchronicity.
The study compares warrants and ETOs over four 
underlying shares: BHP, CBA, RIO and WPL, and 
the sample data collection was limited to 12 specific 
days. 6 Warrants over these four shares account for 
approximately three-quarters of the trading in standard 
equity warrants by value and the value of trades in call 
warrants exceeded that in puts by a factor of seven or 
eight. This is not surprising as the retail investor market is 
generally more comfortable taking positions that benefit 
from share market rises rather than the reverse.
Citigroup, Macquarie Bank and the Royal Bank of Scotland 
(RBS) were the issuers of the 146 standard warrant series 
written over the four stocks. Each issuer had a similar 
spread of warrant issues across the four stocks in question 
TABLE 2: Snapshot of the ASX warrants market on 17 May 2011
Stock Warrants on Issue Warrants with a Bid and Ask Quote Bid, Ask Quote Details
Call Put Total Call* Put* Total* Spread Bid Value# Ask Value#
BHP 24 17 41 17 70.8% 13 76.5% 30 73.2% 0.54% 67,113 64,837
CBA 20 15 35 16 80.0% 12 80.0% 28 80.0% 0.79% 13,727 14,819
RIO 21 15 36 15 71.4% 12 80.0% 27 75.0% 0.57% 39,400 35,100
WPL 20 14 34 14 70.0% 11 78.6% 25 73.5% 1.02% 8,625 9,066
Totals 85 61 146 62 72.9% 48 78.7% 110 75.3% 0.72% 33,672 33,103 
The data were extracted from an IRESS terminal at approximately 3.30 pm on 17 May 2011.
* % figures represent the ratio of warrants with bid and ask quotes to total warrants on issue.
# Bid and ask values are the average value of orders at the current best bid and ask quote levels.
TABLE 3: Snapshot of the ASX ETO market on 17 May 2011
Stock Options on Issue Options with a Bid and Ask Quote Bid, Ask Quote Details#
Call Put Total Call* Put Total Spread Bid Value Ask Value
BHP 555 547 1102 97 17.5% 105 19.2% 202 18.3% 10.9% 7,217.5 6,064.4
CBA 417 408 825 48 11.5% 69 16.9% 117 14.2% 7.7% 8,430.7 8,164.6
RIO 404 398 802 53 13.1% 46 11.6% 99 12.3% 6.4% 5,226.7 8,166.7
WPL 337 329 666 51 15.1% 52 15.8% 103 15.5% 14.7% 5,324.6 4,287.5
All 1713 1682 3395 249 14.5% 272 16.2% 521 15.3% 10.3% 7,161.2 6,574.7 
The data was taken from an IRESS terminal at approximately 3.30 pm on the 17 May 2011.
* % figures represent the ratio of ETOs with bid and ask quotes to issues warrants
# Bid and ask values are the average value of orders at the current best bid and ask quote levels multiplied by the lot size of 100.
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but only 28 (19 per cent of the 146 warrants) were 
duplicates of another series. Trading data in the warrant 
and ETO markets, as at approximately 3.30 pm on 17 May 
2011, are presented in Tables 2 and 3, respectively.
Three-quarters (110) of the warrants had active bid and 
offer prices and they had a narrow bid-ask spread of  
less than 1 per cent (Table 2, third-last column).
Table 3 provides a snapshot of ETO trading activity. 
Observe in Table 3 that of the 3395 option series 
available for trade on 17 May 2011 only 521 (15.3 per cent) 
maintained an extant bid and offer quote. Note the 
relatively low liquidity in the ETO series with bid and ask 
values, on average, being less than $10,000. 
Price analysis
To test the relationship between warrant and option 
prices, we filtered the data for matching series where  
each instrument had valid bid and ask quotes, leaving a 
data set consisting of 571 records on 90 matched warrant 
and ETO contacts. 
We found a number of arbitrage opportunities existed 
between the two markets. A long-arbitrage transaction is 
the simultaneous purchase of a warrant contract (at the 
ask price) and the sale of an equivalent options contract 
(at the bid). Conversely, an immediate short-arbitrage 
opportunity exists if the warrant bid price exceeds the 
ETO ask price. Table 4 presents data that decomposes 
each simultaneous observation on the warrant and option 
markets into three categories: long arbitrage, no arbitrage 
or short arbitrage. Short-arbitrage opportunities existed 
for 92.6 per cent of the observations and the majority of 
stocks exhibited short-arbitrage conditions for more than 
90 per cent of the observations. 
Next we examine the value of the arbitrage opportunities. 
The data in Table 5 show the average difference in value 
of the warrants compared to the value of the equivalent 
ETO expressed as a percentage of the ETO price on a mid-
price (of the bid-ask spread) basis and an arbitrage price 
basis (using the warrant bid price and the option ask in the 
percentage overpricing estimate). 
The data in Table 5 indicate that these warrants (on 
average) are overpriced by 49.4 per cent on a mid-price 
basis and 41.7 per cent on an arbitrage-price basis.7 The law 
of one price does not apply to warrants and their equivalent 
ETO, and the extent of the overpricing of warrants is 
consistent with, but exceeds, the overpricing results 
obtained by Lee (2000) using 1995 to 1999 ASX data.  
Volatility analysis
Another method for comparing the valuation of warrants 
and their equivalent options is to examine their implied 
volatility.8 In principle, market warrant and option prices 
change each time there is a change in the price of the 
underlying security. Implied volatility changes more slowly 
TABLE 4: Warrant/option price arbitrage opportunities
Long Arbitrage No Arbitrage Short Arbitrage Total
BHP 5 2.4% 16 7.5% 191 90.1% 212
CBA 0.0% 7 3.0% 225 97.0% 232
RIO 1 2.0% 6 12.0% 43 86.0% 50
WPL 0.0% 7 9.1% 70 90.9% 77
All 6 1.1% 36 6.3% 529 92.6% 571
A short arbitrage opportunity exists if the warrant bid price exceeds the option ask price. A long arbitrage opportunity exists if the option bid price exceeds the warrant ask price. Otherwise no arbitrage 
opportunity exists.
TABLE 5: Overpricing of warrants as indicated by prices
Mid Price Overpricing* Arbitrage Price Overpricing#
Call Put Total Call Put Total
BHP 33.5% 47.8% 39.1% 26.9% 39.0% 31.7%
CBA 66.2% 81.2% 71.7% 60.1% 72.3% 64.6%
RIO 54.4% 86.8% 68.4% 45.5% 71.7% 56.9%
WPL 21.1% 45.3% 22.9% 14.4% 30.8% 15.6%
All 42.1% 64.2% 49.4% 35.4% 54.3% 41.7%
The mid-prices are the average of the bid and ask prices. Mid price overpricing percentage is computed as the difference between the warrant mid-price and the equivalent option mid-price as a proportion of 
the option mid-price. 
# Arbitrage overpricing is computed as the warrant bid price less the option ask price expressed as a proportion of the option price asking price.
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data are presented in Table 7 over the most recent 30-day 
and 90-day periods. 
Depending on whether 30-day or 90-day volatility is 
used, warrant-implied volatility, on average, is 11.7 per 
cent or 11.4 per cent greater than historic volatility. While 
the difference between the implied volatility and historic 
volatility for warrants will fluctuate between stocks, series 
and days, the probability that there was no difference 
between the two was either 1.1 per cent of 0.6 per cent. 
These probabilities are sufficiently low to make the 
proposition that warrant-implied volatility is comparable 
to historic volatility implausible.
ETO series also traded at a premium to historic volatility; 
4.0 per cent and 3.8 per cent depending on the choice of 
historic volatility. But the premiums are much lower than 
the warrant market equivalent and the probability that the 
difference is zero is 15 per cent or 16 per cent depending 
on whether 30-day or 90-day historic volatility is used.
The results presented in Table 7 indicate ASX ETOs may 
be reasonably priced or slightly overpriced but, more 
importantly, that ASX warrants are definitely overpriced. 
However, it is difficult to place a dollar figure on the 
extent of overpricing. There are no statistics on the net 
warrants sold by issuers as there are no published warrant 
‘open interest’ figures. All that is available are statistics 
indicating the volume and value of trade. These figures 
with changes in perceived underlying asset volatility 
suggesting that implied volatility differences between the 
warrant and ETO markets are less likely to be influenced 
by timing differences during the extraction of the warrants 
and options data.
Evidence of the overpricing of warrants relative to ETOs 
in terms of units of implied volatility is presented in Table 
6. On average, the warrant mid-point implied volatility 
is 7.7 per cent higher than that of ETO options. The 
arbitrage-implied volatility difference, which is computed 
as warrant-bid-implied volatility less option ask-implied 
volatility is 7.3 per cent on average. The probability that 
this level of difference is simply the result of sampling 
error is very low at 3.7 per cent for the mid-point implied 
volatility (assuming the volatility differences are normally 
distributed).
The results presented in Table 5 clearly indicate the 
presence of a price premium applying to warrants relative 
to ETOs but this doesn’t, by itself, indicate which one is 
mispriced. Volatility analysis can provide an indication of 
which market, if any, is fairly priced and which market is 
overpriced.
In an efficient market the implied volatility of options 
ought not to stray far from measured historic volatility and 
thus the difference between implied volatility and historic 
volatility provides a measure of fair/efficient pricing. Such 
TABLE 6: Overpricing of warrants as indicated by average implied volatility
Mid Implied Volatility Difference* Arbitrage Implied Volatility Difference#
Call Put Total Call Put Total
BHP 7.4% 6.9% 7.2% 7.1% 6.6% 6.9%
CBA 8.9% 8.4% 8.7% 8.6% 8.0% 8.3%
RIO 11.1% 10.6% 10.8% 10.5% 9.7% 10.1%
WPL 3.6% 6.0% 4.0% 3.0% 5.4% 3.4%
All 7.5% 7.9% 7.7% 7.1% 7.5% 7.3%
Probability+ 3.3% 4.1% 3.7% 5.1% 6.1% 5.6%
* The mid price is the average of the bid and ask implied volatilities. Mid price overpricing percentage is computed as the average difference between the implied volatility of a warrant and the equivalent 
option’s implied volatility. 
# Arbitrage overpricing is computed using warrant bid implied volatility less the option ask implied volatility.
+ The probability that there is no difference between warrant and ETO implied volatility under an assumption of normality. 
TABLE 7: Implied volatilities relative to historic volatility*
Warrant IV – 30D 
Historic Volatility
ETO IV – 30D Historic 
Volatility
Warrant IV – 90D 
Historic Volatility
ETO IV – 90D Historic 
Volatility
BHP 10.3% 3.1% 10.7% 3.5%
CBA 13.9% 5.2% 11.9% 3.2%
RIO 15.0% 4.2% 13.6% 2.7%
WPL 6.9% 2.8% 10.8% 6.7%
All 11.7% 4.0% 11.4% 3.8%
Probability+ 1.1% 15.1% 0.6% 16.4%
IV = implied volatility, 30D = 30 day, 90D = 90 day.
+ The probability that there is no difference between warrant and ETO implied volatility under an assumption of normality.
JASSA The Finsia Journal of Applied Finance Issue 4 2011    43
are not sufficient in and of themselves to place a number 
on the net flow of funds from the warrant holders to the 
warrant issuers due to overpricing.  
It clear from the results presented in Table 6 and Table 
7 that standard equity warrants are overpriced. But 
according to the data in Table 1, standard equity warrants 
represent only 4.7 per cent of the overall warrants market. 
However, the overpricing of standard equity options may 
be a manifestation of the general overpricing of option-
type warrants. We examined the pricing of equity barrier 
warrants to investigate this possibility. 
Barrier warrants have no direct counterparts in the ETO 
market. Thus it is not possible to estimate a warrant’s 
overpricing through direct comparison with ETO prices. 
It is, however, possible to estimate barrier warrant 
overpricing by comparing the market prices of barrier 
warrants to theoretical barrier warrant prices using 
appropriate volatility measures. Table 8 displays the 
percentage difference between the market mid-price 
for knockout barrier warrants and the theoretical barrier 
option price using either (a) implied volatility gleaned from 
the standard ETO market or (b) 60-day historic volatility.
Surprisingly (given their lack of transparency born of 
structural complexity) the results presented in Table 8 
indicate a lower degree of overpricing for barrier warrants 
than for standard warrants. Barrier warrants overpricing is 
of the order of 25 per cent compared with the 50 per cent 
overpricing prevailing in the standard warrants market.
Conclusions
There is strong evidence that ASX warrants are overpriced 
relative to both ETO options and fair value using historic 
volatility. A warrant traded at fair value systematically 
favours neither the buyer nor the seller. However, a warrant 
traded on an overpriced basis systematically benefits the 
seller and penalises the purchaser.9 Warrant trading is a 
zero-sum game and the ASX warrant market is such that, 
at any point in time, the net sellers are investment banks 
only and the net buyers are largely retail investors.  
Investment banks are exploiting retail investors by selling 
them overpriced securities. Warrant-issuing investment 
banks, while having marketing costs, face very little risk 
selling overpriced warrants. A warrant issuer can lock-
in the profit associated with the sale of an overpriced 
warrant by either purchasing an identical ETO or by delta 
hedging their short position by purchasing stock in the 
share market.    
The warrant market structure favouring issuers is 
supported by the ban on warrant short-selling. Market 
forces would immediately return warrant prices to at 
least ETO levels, if not fair value, if arbitrageurs were 
allowed to short-sell warrants. The ASX currently provides 
organisational infrastructure to facilitate short selling 
in many of its markets.10 While there would be some 
additional costs associated with providing traders with 
the ability to short sell, these costs would be small in 
comparison with the amount currently being appropriated 
from retail warrant investors via the systematic 
overpricing of warrants.  
The principle recommendation of this paper is that the 
warrant short-selling be allowed. We also recommend that 
conversion factors be limited to 1:1 so as to improve the 
transparency of warrant value.
TABLE 8: Estimate of the overpricing of barrier warrants
  Sample Numbers Overpricing
        Option Implied Volatility* Historic Volatility#
Stock Call Put Both Call Put Both Call Put Both
BHP 7 8 15 19.1% 8.0% 13.2% 18.3% 8.5% 13.1%
CBA 8 7 15 38.8% 22.6% 31.2% 39.1% 22.3% 31.3%
RIO 7 9 16 13.5% 41.8% 29.5% 12.9% 43.4% 30.1%
WPL 6 5 11 22.3% 29.7% 25.7% 22.0% 30.0% 25.7%
All 28 29 57 24.0% 25.8% 24.9% 23.7% 26.4% 25.1%
*Average implied volatility for each stock was obtained from standard ETO and used to compute theoretical knock-out barrier option prices.
# 60-day historical volatility was used to compute theoretical knock-out barrier option prices.
The warrant market structure favouring issuers is 
supported by the ban on warrant short-selling. Market 
forces would immediately return warrant prices to at least 
eTO levels, if not fair value, if arbitrageurs were allowed 
to short-sell warrants. 
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Notes
1. See Lee, p. 9.
2. American or European exercise style.
3. LEPOS are low exercise call options that have virtually no time 
value. MINIs are geared undated forward contracts.
4. Any increase (decrease) in the price of the underlying security 
beyond the exercise price hurts a call (put) warrant issuer.
5. Delta hedging is a name given to the practice of hedging an 
options position by holding a proportional and opposite position 
in the underlying security. The quantum of the position held is 
determined by the option position’s sensitivity to changes in the 
price of the underlying security, i.e. the option’s delta.
6. Data was taken from IRESS in the 30 minutes to the close on the 
following days: 4, 8, 11, 12, 15, 18, 21 and 28 April; and 3, 5, 9 and 17 
May 2011. 
7. The results when overpricing is weighted by the value of trade in 
the underlying stocks are essentially the same.
8. This study did not calculate implied volatility measures directly, 
but rather used the implied volatility numbers generated by IRESS.
9. For example, the probability of a purchaser of an at-the-money, 
two-month, call warrant (using realistic assumptions re interest 
rate, dividend rate and volatility) making a profitable trade is 53 
per cent. This probability is reduced to 35 per cent if the warrant 
were purchased at a 25 per cent premium over fair value. 
10. For example, the ASX allows short selling in its market for 
company stock, its ETO market and its futures and associated 
options market.
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